

ON SCENE COORDINATOR COURSE

IAMSAR MANUAL VOLUME III

CASE STUDY : M/S LE JOOLA

By Capt Malick NDIAYE

OUTLINES

- I- Vessel presentation
- II- History before incident
- III- Voyage and Incident
- IV- Lessons learned
- V- Key role of OSC
- VI- Conclusion



I-M/S LE JOOLA: General Characteristics



Class and type:	<u>Roll-on/roll-off</u> ferry
Tonnage:	2,087 <u>GRT</u>
Length:	79.5 m (260 ft 10 in)
Beam:	12 m (39 ft 4 in)
Draft:	3.1 m (10 ft 2 in)
Capacity:	•536 passengers •35 cars
Crew:	44

II- M/S LE JOOLA: HISTORY



Name:	<i>Le Joola</i>
Owner:	Republique Senegal, Ministere de l'Equipement, Dakar / Senegal
Operator:	SenegaleseNavy
Port of registry:	<u>Senegal</u>
Route:	<u>Dakar to Casamance</u>
Builder:	Schiffswerft Germersheim GmbH (Germany)
Acquired:	1990
Out of service:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•13 September 2001 – 10 September 2002•Mechanical damage repair and replacement of the port side engine
Identification:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•<u>IMO number: 9019901</u>•<u>Callsign: 6VYZ</u>
Fate:	Capsized and sunk in rough seas 26 September 2002
Status:	Wreck
Notes:	The ship was overloaded with an estimated 1,863 aboard at the time of disaster.

III-M/S LE JOOLA: Voyage and incident

26 September 2002

- At about 1:30 pm on : *Le Joola* set sail from Ziguinchor in the Casamance region;
- At 10 pm: last call from the ferry staff was broadcast to a maritime security center (navy operation coordination center) in Dakar. Reported good travel conditions;
- At around 11 pm, the ship sailed into a storm off the coast of Gambia;
- the ferry capsized, throwing passengers and cargo into the sea, all within five minutes



III-M/S LE JOOLA: Voyage and incident

- Rough sea and wind
- Overcrowding: Ship unstable. Due to the heat and claustrophobic conditions below deck, as many passengers as possible usually slept on the upper level, making the ship more unstable.

III-M/S LE JOOLA: Voyage and incident

- Overcrowding: Ship was designed to carry a maximum of 580 passengers and crew, an estimated 2000 passengers are believed to have been on board and at least 1,863 died; 64 survivors.
- Failure to respond quickly enough to disaster; communications
- Slow rescue work; No OSC
- Poor coordination: Lack of SAR COORDINATOR, SMC



IV-Lessons learned


1-SAR System

No alert system: Only predefined periods of communication with navy operational center;

No SAR system; contingency plan

NO OSC: A large number of fishing vessels around the hull waiting for instructions. Only 64 men overboard were rescued. Vessel capsized down.

No risk evaluation




1-SAR System

The need to establish a SAR system with three general levels of co-ordination

- On-scene-co-ordinators (OSCs)
- SAR mission co-ordinators (SMC) – (RCC) Operational role : 'the official temporarily assigned to coordinate response to an actual or apparent distress situation', usually based at a Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) and nominated from among its staff (IAMSAR Manual)
- SAR co-ordinators (SCs) (National level) For establishing and providing SAR services and ensuring that planning for those services is properly coordinated. (IAMSAR Manual)

V- Key role of OSC



V- Key role of OSC

Fisrt unit in the incident site

Gives alert to the RCC or makes an own decision if communications with land authorites do not go through

OSC shift if another vessel with more capabilities

Report periodically to the SMC

HIGH AUTHORITY IN CHARGE OF MARITIME SECURITY AND SAFETY (HASSMAR)

- Placed under Presidency general Secretary authority;
- Establish MRCC and RSCs for maritime security and safety watch on SAR AOR;
- Train personnels to meet IMO and IMRF recommendations;
- Establish contingency plans to provide SAR services;
- Test and review plans;
- Coordinate maritime administration's responses to distress situation from the MRCC.

Thank you for your attention

QUESTIONS